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Interest of Amicru

The American Civil Liberties Union, of which the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio and the New York Civil
Liberties Union are affiliates, is a national organization of
persons dedicated to the preservation of a free and open
society, principally through the protections embodied in
our Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
The formulation of standards of criminal due process
consistent with the imperatives of individual liberty in an
·ordered society has long been a Yital function of this Court.
The entire spectrum of the rights of the accused has demanded, and quite properly received, its ever-increasing
attention. Nowhere, however, is the relationship between
the accused and prosecutorial government more critical
than at the very inception of the criminal process-at the
point of arrest and accompa~ying search-an area traditionally safeguarded by the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.
The instant cases involve the application of the Fourth
Amendment to on-the-street detention and interrogation,
(known in street vernacular as "stop and frisk,"). 1 In the
opinion of the President's Commission on Law Enforce1 The use by arnici of the term "stop and frisk" throughout this
brief is occasioned by its brevity. Wherever generally used, and
as used here, the phrase has come to mean on-the-street detention
for purposes of police interrogation, accompanied by a search of
the person of the suspect, ostensibly for the purpose of protecting
the safety of the police officer. In the absence of probable cause,
the subsequent use of incriminating evidence so obtained to convict
the suspect of a crime, demonstrates that, under some circumstances, a policeman's suspicion, like virtue, is its own reward.
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ment, "No matter is more important to police-comm.unity
relations than the manner in which police officers talk to
people on the street." 2 The failure, in the name of police
efficiency, to compel constitutional conduct in this sphere
is, in the long view, inefficient as well as unconstitutionalit serves only to discredit the entire system of law enforcement in the eyes of the community which it serves and
upon which it must ultimately depend to combat crime.
It is in the hope that in some measure amici may be
of assistance to the Court in performing its delicate task
in the instant case of weighing "the social need that
crime shall be repressed" 3 against "the social need that
the law will not be flouted by the insolence of office"' that
this brief is filed.

The written consent of the parties to this appearance
by amici has been obtained and filed with the Clerk of the
Court.
Statement ·of the Case
Terry and Chilton

On October 31, 1963, at about 2 :30 p.m., in broad daylight,
petitioners were seen on a busy street in the business district in downtown Cleveland, Ohio (R. 12, 116). A plainclothes police officer (R. 122), assigned to stores and pickpockets in the do,vntown area (R. 106), observed their behavior for a period of about ten minutes (R. 13) from a
2

Task Force Report : The Police 180 ( 1967).

3 Cardozo, J. in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 24, 150 N. E.
585, 589 (1926).

'Ibid.
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vantage point across the street approximately 300 to 400
feet away (R. 12). He noted that petitioners, both Negroes,
were walking back and forth on the sidewalk in front of a
row of stores, peering in the windows of one of several
stores (R. 23, 119) and returning to the corner, when they
engaged in conversation with each other, and ultimately
with a third man, a white man, who joined them later (R.
13, 22). Although he had no previous information about
them (R. 119), did not know them (R. 119), and admitted
that there was nothing unusual about their dress or appearance (R. 120) or their gait (R. 15, 121), ·he "suspected they were waiting for an opportunity to pull a stickup" (R. 138) despite the fact that he had never arrested
anyone before for a prospective "stick-up" (R. 160) nor
had he ever in his entire thirty-five years of experience
as a detective observed anyone "casing a place" for prospective misconduct (R. 46).
He subsequently testified that he "didn't like them (R.
118) or "their actions" (R. 42)_, that he "was just attracted
to them and• • • surmised that there was something going
on" (R. 47), and that he did not know whether if he saw
them engaged in the identical conduct again he would have
had any cause for suspicion (R. 47).
In any event, when the police officer saw the three men
com.-ersing, he ran across the street (R. 121) and in the
ordinary pedestrian traffic of a busy street in a commercial
district during business hours (R. 124), accosted petitioners
and the other man (R. 16). He said he was a police officer
but did not show his badge (R. 122), or identify himself
further (R. 123). He asked the men their names (R. 16,
123), and they responded with alacrity (R. 16). Whereupon the police officer grasped petitioner Terry, turned

467

5
him around and patted the outside of his topcoat, felt the
outlines of a weapon, reached into the upper left hand in.
side pocket of his topcoat, felt the handle of a gun, and,
when he could not pull the gun out of the pocket easily,
pulled the topcoat off petitioner and seized the weapon (R.
16, 124). The police officer then ordered the three men into
a nearby store (R. 13, 125), shouted to the storekeeper to
"call the wagon" (R. 125 )-at which point the police officer
conceded all three men were under arrest, Terry for carrying a concealed weapon (R. 33), the other two for "association with him" (R. 131). While they had their hands raised
above their heads, the police officer proceeded to search
petitioner Chilton and the other man (R. 17), and discovered and seized a gun in the outer left hand pocket of
Chilton's coat (R.17, 19). Search of the other man revealed
no weapons (R. 17) . .All three men were transported to the
police station (R. 134). Petitioners were charged initially
with "investigation" and then with carrying concealed
weapons in violation of Section 2923.01 Ohio Revised Code
(R. 129).
The trial judge, after expressly rejecting the contention
of the prosecution that the seizure of the weapons was pursuant to a lawful arrest (R. 100), overruled defense motions
to suppress on the ground that "the guns [were] the fruit
of the frisk, and not of a search" (R. 98).
P~ters

On July 10, 1964 at about 1 :00 p.m.~ Samuel Lasky, a
New York City Policeman, at the time off-duty, heard a
noise at the door of his apartment in Mount Vernon. He
looked through the peephole of the door and saw appellant
Peters and another man "tiptoeing" down the hallway (R.
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15). Although Lasky's apartment building houses approximately 120 tenants (R. 14), when Lasky didn't recognize the
men he called police headquarters to report the incident
(R. 15). He then returned to the peephole and saw the two
men still tiptoeing down the hall toward a stairway (R. 15).
With his service gun in hand he ran down the hallway and
down the stairs after the two men. Lasky apprehended
Peters as the latter was "walking in a rapid way" down
the stairway away from him (R. 15, 19).
Seizing Peters by the shirt collar (R. 16, 20), Lasky
questioned him at gunpoint (R. 18) as to what he was doing
in the building. There is no testimony in the record which
would indicate that Lasky was in any danger of any kind
as he held Peters at gun point. Peters said that he was
looking for a girl friend. When asked for her name, he
stated that she was a married woman and declined to name
her (R. 21). Lasky then "frisked" Peters (R. 21), felt a
hard object in Peters' right pants pocket, and took out an
opaque plastic envelope (R. 17,_18). In the envelope, Lasky
found ''6 picks and 2 Allen wrenches with the short leg filed
down to a screwdriver edge, and a tension bar" (R. 17).
Peters was then arrested by City of Mount Vernon Police
who arrived in response to Lasky's earlier telephone call.
After indictment for illegal possession of burglar's tools,
defendant's motion for the suppression of the evidence
seized by Lasky during the "frisk" was denied (R. 3-4).
Sibron

On March 9, 1965, Patrolman Anthony Martin of the
New York Police apprehended Sibron in a restaurant in
Brooklyn. Officer Martin, in uniform, ordered Sibron to
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step outside. As Sibron left the restaurant, the officer
stated, "You know what I am after" (R. 16). Sibron and
the officer then, more or less simultaneously, reached into
Sibron's jacket pocket where the officer grabbed several
packets of narcotics (R. 16-17). The officer did not have
a search warrant (R. 9-10).
Officer Martin testiiied that on ::\farch 9th, over a period
of eight hours, he had observed Sibron in conver·sation
with six or eight persons who he knew to be drug addicts
(R. 13-15). When Sibron went into the restaurant, Officer
Martin saw him speaking ·with three other known addicts
(R. 15). He did not know what any of the conversations
were about (R. 18). He then called Sibron from the restaurant, questioned and searched him, and discovered the
packets of heroin (R. 16-17).
A motion to suppress the eYidence was denied (R. 20).
In the view of aniici, although some factual distinctions
among these cases might be made, they are distinctions
without a constitutional difference and all are entitled to
reversal for the same legal reasons. .Accordingly, amici
have consolidated their legal arguments for reversal of all
three cases in the balance of this brief.
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Argument

The instant cases present for review examples of a growing trend of state court decisions 5 and statutes 6 authorizing
police to stop, question, and "frisk" or search "suspicious
persons" without probable cause to belieYe that the suspect
5 California: People v. Garrett, 238 Cal. App. 2d 292, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 731 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Feople v. Michelson, 59 Cal.
2d 448, 450-51 (1963); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Ballou,
217 N. E. 2d 187 (1966); New York: People v. Pugach, 15 N. Y. 2d
65, 204 N. E. 2d 176, cert. den. 380 U. S. 936 (1965); People v.
Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 201 N. E. 2d 32, cert. denied 379 U. S.
978 (1964); New Jersey: State v. Dilley, 49 N. J. 460 (1967);
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Hicks, 223 .A. 2d 873 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1966). But see United States v. l\Iargeson, 259 F. Supp. 256
(E. D. Pa. 1966) and cases cited at footnote 22 infra.

N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a, >rhich is raised for review in
Nos. 63 and 74. A "Stop and Search" bill was introduced in the
Ohio legislature early in the 1967 session and defeated after a
vigorous floor debate. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 23, 1967,
p. 4 col. 3. A similar fate was met by recently proposed statutes
in Illinois (H. B. 10i8) and Mic}:iigan (S. B. 74:7). See, Frisking
in the Absence of Sufficient Grounds for Arrest as a Common Police
Practice Today, 1965 U. ILL. L. F. 119, 127; see also, .A.:r.IERICAN LAw
INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PREARR.AIGN)IEXT PROCEDURE § 2.02
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966); A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S .COMMISSION ON L.AW EXFORCE~fENT AND THE .A.DMIXISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLEXGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 1. C S. Govt. Printing
Office, Feb. 1967).
Section 180-a of the N. Y. Code of Criminal Procedure is modeled
upon the Uniform •.\.rrest Act promulgated more than twenty years
ago by the Interstate Commission on Crime. See \Varner, "The
Uniform Arrest Act", 28 U. Va. L. Rev. 315 (1942). Statutes
modeled on the Uniform Arrest Act have been enacted in New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Delaware. X. H. Laws, §§ 594 :2-3
( 1955) ; R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-7-1 (1965) ; Del. Code Ann. Tit.
11, § 1902 ( 1953). Similar legislation has also been enacted in
Hawaii, Massachusetts and the City of Miami, Florida. Rev. Laws
of Hawaii, Tit. 30, ch. 255, §§ 4-5 (1955); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41,
§ 98 (1961); Code of City of Miami, Florida, § 43-46 (1957), as
amended by Ord. Xo. 7,367 (1965).
6
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has committed a crime. Unless this Court acts, this trend
will effectively emasculate the shield of probable cause
which the Fourth Amendment has heretofore interposed
between the legitimate investigative function of the police
and the right of the individual to be let alone.
It cannot be doubted that for many years, state police
officers have been stopping and frisking suspects, without
their consent, without a search warrant or probable cause,
and using the yield of such searches to convict them of
crimes. The constitutionality of such police practice has
been in doubt at least since Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25
(1949), which applied the core of the Fourth Amendment
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth. The evidence so seized has been constitutionally
inadmissible in state criminal cases since Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U. S. 643 (1961} as a result of the elevation of the
federal exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232
U. S. 383 (1914), to a constitutional command. And when
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1.964) made it clear that federal
standards of arrest, including the constitutional condition
precedent of probable cause, set the minimal requirements
of valid state arrest as well, the constitutional threat to
continued state police "stop and frisk" activity was evident.

The decisions and statutes which have upheld the validity
of "stops and frisks" have reasoned ( i) that a "stop"-a
compulsory detention by the police for purposes of interrogation-is not an arrest requiring probable cause for its
validity, but a species of sub-arrest or non-arrest to which
none of the constitutional requirements of arrest apply and
which may lawfully be effected on "suspicion" or "reason-
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able suspicion" of past or even future crimes, and (ii) that
a ''frisk"-which the courts have frequently defined as "the
patting of the exterior of one's clothing in order to detect
by touch the presence of a concealed weapon" 1-is a "lesser
degree" invasion of privacy than a "full-blown search of
the person" and is accordingly "reasonable" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when effected incident
to a "stop" and when the policeman "suspects" (although
without probable cause) that the frisk is necessary for his
self protection. In No. 67, the lower court added the further novel observation that even if the frisk was unconstitutional, the raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule of Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) does not require the product
of the frisk to be barred from evidence since "a judicial
rule rendering evidence produced as the result of a 'frisk'
inadmissible would fail to deter the police from 'frisking'
suspects believed to be armed, as police 'frisk' for their
own protection rather than for the purpose of looking for
evidence." 8
Tenuous as the foregoing reasoning is, the lower courts
have in practice applied the "stop and frisk" doctrine so as
to reduce their own stated requirement of "reasonable suspicion" to mere "intuition," and to validate arrests which
are more than mere temporary detentions, and general
searches which are more than mere "frisks" and which have
no relation whatever to the self-protection needs of the
police officer.
People v. Peters, 18 N. Y. 2d 238, 245 (1966); People v. Rivera,
14 N. Y. 2d 441, 446 (1964); State v. Terry, 214 N. E. 2d at 120.
But see People v. Taggart, --N. Y. 2d - - (July 7, 1967).
7

8

214 N. E. 2d 121.
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Thus, in No. 74, the New York Court of Appeals defined
the "reasonable suspicion" required for stop and frisk
under Section 180-a of the N. Y. Code of Criminal Procedure in the broadest possible terms as constituting the mere
intuition of the experienced police officer:
"By requiring the reasonable suspicion of a police officer,
the statute incorporates the experienced police officer~s
intuitive knowledge and appraisal of criminal activity.
His evaluation of the various factors involved insures
a protective, as well as definitive, standard" 18 N. Y.
2d at 245. (Emphasis added.)
Judge Van Voorhis accurately defined the scope of ~180-a
and the New York case law in his dissent in No. 63 belo,Y,
as follows:
"The power to frisk is practically unlimited, inasmuch as whether an officer 'reasonably suspects' that
someone is committing, has committed or is about to
commit a felony necessarily depends to a large extent
upon the subjective operations of the mind of the officer" 18 N. Y. 2d 605.&
In No. 74, the lower court upheld the forcible apprehension of appellant Peters at gunpoint as a mere "frisk"
since no formal arrest was made. Yet the Supreme Court
of New Jersey has since held that a "stop", not an arrest,
occurred even where the officer formally advised the accused
that he was under arrest. The Court observed:
9 Indeed, the lower courts in No. 6i and No. 74 implied that a
person is protected from detention and search under the "stop
and frisk" doctrine only where his activities are "perfectly normal".
See People v. Peters, 18 N. Y. 2d at 246 and 254 N. Y. Supp. 2d
at 13; State v. Terry, 214 N. E. 2d at 118.
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" ... it seems evident to us that the legality of incidental
street detention for purposes of summary inquiry
should not be permitted to turn on whether it is formally labelled as an arrest but rather on whether it
was reasonable in the light of the circumstances." State
v. Dilley, 49 N. J. 460, 467-68 (1967).
Moreover, ~'frisks" have not been limited to "the patting
of the exterior of one's clothing". In No. 74, the frisk of
appellant was completed when he felt a hard object in appellant's pocket and withdrew an opaque envelope from
the pocket. The officer \Vent further, however, and searched
the envelope. Similarly~ in No. 63, the New York Court of
Appeals held valid a so-called frisk where "the officer put
his hand into the suspect's pocket" (18 N. Y. 2d 604). In
People v. Taggart, - - N. Y. 2d - - (July 7, 1967), the
New York Court of Appeals explicitly acknowledged that
the so-called "frisks" in these cases were "searches" and
explicitly held that §180-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure authorized searches of the person without
probable cause.
Finally, although the stop and frisk doctrine has been
rationalized on the basis of the self-defense needs of the
police officer, lower courts have not limited the doctrine to
circumstances where a frisk is genuinely necessary for the
protection of the policeman. In Ko. 74 there is not one
shred of evidence that the officer reasonably-or even unreasonably-believed he was in any danger as he held appellant Peters by the collar, at gun point, and questioned
him. Moreover, any danger that may have existed in that
situation was removed at the moment when the officer removed the opaque envelope from appellant's pocket. There
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existed no further possible danger to justify the officer's
opening the envelope and examining its contents.10 There
is a similar complete lack of evidence of danger to the officers in Nos. 67 and 63. As Judge Van Voorhis noted in his
dissent in No. 63 below, the authorization to search granted
to the police in New York has been defined so broadly that
"the safety of the officer or public from Yiolence is not
remotely involved". 18 N. Y. 2d 607.

Amici urge that (I) the detentions and interrogations
in the three cases at bar were arrests or "seizures of persons" within the purview of the Fourth Amendment, as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth, and that they
were invalid by operation of that same constitutional authority; (II) the "frisks'' were searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth, and invalid by that same authority; and (III) the use of the yield of the searches in evidence against the defendants cannot be justified by the
public policy of protecting the safety of police officers.
Each of these contentions will be considered in sequence
below.

10 Similarly, in People v. Pugach, 15 N. Y. 2d 65 (1965), cert.
deil. 380 U. S. 936 ( 1965), where the police searched the defendant's
briefcase before taking him to the police station for questioning, any
possible danger to the police from a weapon in the briefcase could
have been elimi:..1ated by the simple expedient of keeping the briefcase away from the defendant in the front seat of the police car, and
no search of the briefcase ·was necessary. See 15 N. Y. 2d at 71
(Fuld, J., dissenting).
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I.
The detentions and interrogations were illegal seizures
of the person.

This Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits any arrest without "probable cause".11 In
the context of the instant cases, it is well to bear in mind
that this prohibition is based upon the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on "seizures" of "persons":
" . . . it is the command of the Fourth Amendment
that no warrants for either searches or arrests shall
issue except 'upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' "
Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 100 (1959)
Thus, it is
able cause
limited to
the courts

clear that the well settled requirement of probextends to all seizures of the person and is not
"arrests" in some restricted, formal sense as
below have held. 12

. Each of the so-ralbd "stops" in the instant cases unquestionably constituted an unlawful seizure of the person
in violation of the Fourth .<\mendment.
11 See \Yong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Rios
v. United States, 364 U. S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States,
361 U. S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

See also Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use
or Misuse of the Euphemisms, 57 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 251, 257;
Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity and the Law
of Arrest, 51 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 402, 403-04.
12
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There is ample authority for the contention that at the
moment Terry and Sibron were first stopped and questioned by a police officer -;;ono identified himself as suchat the moment they wer~ rcztrained of their liberty of motion by a law enforce:!:!:lc::nt 2.~thority of the state-they
were under arrest for erJ~titY.tional purposes. 13 Henry v.
United States, 361 U. S. !":13~ :03 (1959) so holds. Those
who seek to avoid the con~r::qn~nces of the Henry "moment
of restriction of liberty~~ .rule rJi arrest urge that the Government concession in H ~nry tb.at the arrest took place at
the moment of the "stop:~ limits that decision to its particular facts. Such attempts to dilute the holding of Henry
fail to consider the fact that although the Court \vas not
bound by the Government::-: concession, 14 it viewed the facts
of the case independently and concluded that "[w]hen the
officers interrupted the two m<::n and restricted their liberty
of movement, the arrest • • • \Vas complete." 15 There is
substantial lower court authority to support this interpretation of Henry. 16
13 It might parenthetically hr~ nrJtr'd that the authority granted
a police officer under the instant r:as<:s to stop and question suspects
substantial r:ur:stirJns
under Miranda Y. Arizona '
raises senarate
.
.
384 U.S. 436 (1966), should an attr:mpt be made to introduce the
suspect's response to such r;ur.:sti<min~ in evidence. See also Reich,
Police Questioning of Lau:-Abvling Citizens, 75 Yale L. J. 1161
(1966).
14

361 U.S. at 105 (Clark, .J., dissr:nting).

15

Id. at 103. Cf. Rios v. "'Cnite<l States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).

16 See United States v. Baxtc,r, 361 F. 2d 116 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. den. 385 U. S. 134 ( 1966) ; Seals v. United States, 325 F. 2d
1006 (D. C. Cir. 1963) ; rnited States v. Viale, 312 F. 2d 595, 601
(2nd Cir. 1963); Kelly v. "Cnited States, 298 F. 2d 310 (D. C.
Cir. 1961) ; Coleman '· rnitr<l States, 295 F. 2d 555 (D. C. Cir.
1961), cert. den. 369 u. S. 813 ( 1962); Green v. United States,
259 F. 2d 180 (D. C. Cir. 1058), eert. den. 359 U. S. 917 ( 1959) ;
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In any case, there can be little doubt that once a police
officer lays hands on a suspect and forceably restrains his
movement or exacts involuntary movement from him, an
''arrest" or "seizure" for constitutional purposes has oecurred, and philosophic and semantic distinctions between
"arrest" and "detention" become (if they have not always
been) hopelessly irrelevant. See Henry v. United States,
361 u. s. 98, 104 (1959):
"Under our system suspicion is not enough for an
officer to lay hands on a citizen."
See also United States v. Rios, 364 U. S. 253, where, in
remanding the cases for resolution of a conflict in testimony, this Court held that if a police officer approached a
suspect with his revolver drawn and "took hold of the
defendant's arm" (364 U. S. at 257-58) before the officer
had probable cause to make .an arrest, an unconstitutional
arrest or seizure of the person had occurred. 364 U. S. at
261-62. 17
United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D. D. C. 1957); Long
Ansell, 69 F. 2d 386 (D. C. Cir. 1934) ; United States v. Mitchell,
179 F. Supp. 636 (D. D. C. 1959); Turney v. Rhoades, 42 Ga. App.
104, 155 S. E. 112 (1930).
See also Foote, The Fourth .Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity
and the Law of .Arrest, 51 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 402 (1960).
But see contra: Vnited States Y. Thomas. 250 F. Supp. 771
(S. D. X. Y. 1966); United States v. Vita. 294 F. 2d 524 (2d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U. S. 823 (1962); Busby v. United
States, 296 F. 2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Bonanno,
180 F. Supp. 71 (S. D. :N". Y. 1960) rev'd on other grounds sub nom.;
United States Y. Bufalino, 285 F. 2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
Y.

1 ~ And see Green v. United States, 259 F. 2d 180, 182 (D. C. Cir.
1958), cert. den. 359 U. S. 917 ( 1959) : "Had he remained standing
where he was first accosted, or had he merely refused to talk, the
police would have lacked probable cause either to arrest or to
search him. The officers would have had no justifiable reason
to lay hands upon him."
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If the protections of privacy derived from the Fourth
Amendment are to remain meaningful, if they are not to
be diluted beyond recognition and beyond the legitimate
needs of law enforcement, Fourth Amendment standards
should be applied in each instance of governmental restraint of the person of its citizenry, no matter how fleeting, without the substitution of semantic devices for constitutional requirements. For careful analysis "exposes
the thinness of the claim that investigative arrests are
essential to public safety. On the contrary, the practice
of investigative arrests breeds resentment, discourages
thorough police work, and sets an official standard of lawlessness." 18

II.
The frisks were illegal searches•
.Amici have urged that arrests or seizures of the person
for purposes of constitutional analysis occurred before the
"frisks," that they were invalid arrests or seizures in the
absence of probable cause to make them, and that the suppression of evidence obtained incidental thereto was therefore constitutionally compelled. If the Court so holds, the
legal analysis in these cases is over. For it has never been
seriously contended that a non-consensual warrantless
search, without independent probable causP- to search, may
be justified by a contemporaneous unconstitutional arrest.

But even if this court should somehow affirm the position taken by the courts below and hold that the "stopping"
18 Joint Comm. on the District of Columbia. Crime in the District
of Columbia, H. R. Rep. No. 176, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1965)
(minority views) .
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of some or all of the petitioners and appellants in the instant cases constituted an "investigatory detention" which
is not itself in violation of the Fourth Amendment, such a
non-arrest cannot validate under the Fourth Amendment
the frisks of petitioners and appellants which occurred.
The Fourth Amendnment, as construed by this Court, does
not merely prohibit searches incident to unlawful arrests;
heretofore any search without a warrant, based upon probable cause has been considered lawful only if made incident to a lawful arrest made upon probable cause. E.g.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 112, n. 3, 122 (1964);
Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253, 261-64 (1960). There
is no authority whatever justifying any search on the basis
of its being reasonably incident to an "investigatory detention" made on less than probable cause.
The attempted constitutional justification which has been
advanced for the "frisk" is even more tenuous than the
constitutional sanction advanced for the ''stop." The attempt to exempt the "frisk" fJ;"om the Fourth Amendment
protections has taken two forms. First, by semantic alchemy, it is denied that a "frisk" is a search within the
operation of the Fourth Amendment. Second, even where
it is conceded that, '\Yithin the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, the "stop" is a seizure of the person and the
"frisk" is a search, both the "stop'' and incidental "frisk"
are sought to be justified, in the absence of probable cause,
as "reasonable searches and seizures," under a test of "reasonableness" which, it is argued, is an interchangeable
alternative to the requirement of probable cause.19
Each of these arguments

'\Vill

be discussed below.

19 The American Law Institute has taken this view. See MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
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A. A. "Frisk" ls a Search Within the Meaning
of the Fourth Amendment

The suggestion that a police officer who runs his hand~
over the outside clothing on the body of a suspect in the
public street without his consent for the express purpose
of determining what the suspect has concealed inside his
clothing is conducting, not a search, but a frisk-a form of
non-search or sub-search which defies Fourth Amendment
proscription-would be ludicrous if its consequences were
not so destructive of "the right to be let alone." 20
Judge Fuld, dissenting in People v. Rivera, has properly
destroyed this attempted distinction:
"This is nothing but an exercise in semantics; a search
by any other name is still a search. Viewed in the
perspective of constitutionally protected interests, a
police tactic-call it a search or, more euphemistically,
a 'frisk'-which leads to discovery of a gun in an individual's pocket by trespassing on his person is indisputably an invasion of privacy. A 'frisk' is a species
of search and, in point of fact, both decisions and
dictionaries so define it • • • .
"Free men should no more be subject to having the
police run their hands over their pockets than through
them. :N"either the Fourth Amendment nor, for that
matter, the common law of tort distinguishes • • *
between a cursory search and a more elaborate one.
In both instances, it is the slightest touching which is
condemned, and the reason for this is the insult
20 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
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to individuality, to individual liberty, is as grave and
as objectionable in the one case as in the other." 21
Indeed, in People v. Taggart, - - N. Y. 2d - - (July
7, 1967), the New York Court of Appeals abandoned its
distinction between a "frisk" and a "search" and explicitly
held that ~180-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure authorized searches of the person incident to "stops"
made on less than probable cause.
The governing principle that any invasion of privacy
is subject to constitutional protection was clearly stated as
long ago as Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
In Boyd, where the Court struck down a statute requiring
importers to produce certain invoices or admit the government's allegations as to the contents of the invoices, this
Court discussed Lord Camden's decision in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, and concluded, 116 U. S. at
630:
"The principles laid down in this opinion affect the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security.
They reach farther than the concrete form of the case
then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property, where
21 People v. Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 449-450, 201 N. E. 2d 32,
37, 252 N. Y. S. 2d 458, 466 (1964), cert. denied 379 U. S. 978
(1964).
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that right has never been forfeited by his conviction
of some public offense,-it is the invasion of this sacred
right which underlies and constitutes the essence of
Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house and
opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of
a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be
used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit
his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment.
In this regard, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run
almost into each other."
The Court further noted that
"constitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed. . . . It is the
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Id. p. 635.
It is obvious that the patting of the exterior of one's clothing is an invasion into the "privacies of life", "personal
security", and "personal liberty", and that, under the Boyd
and Entick decisions, it is this invasion "that constitutes the
essence of the offense" while any distinctions of degree
which may exist between such a "frisk" and a "full-blown
search" are merely differences as to the "circumstances of
aggravation".
It is noteworthy that the specific portions of the Boyd
decisions quoted above were reaffirmed in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U. S. 643, 646-67 (1961), and more recently in Berger v.
United States, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). 22
22 Several lower courts have squarely held that a frisk of an
accused for weapons is indistinguishable from a "full-blown search"
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The attempt to withdraw searches of any particular
variety from the operation of the Fourth Amendment by
a process of nomenclature and classification is both sterile
and dangerous. Calling a search a "frisk" and excluding
it from Fourth .Amendment controls because of its label
is a form of non-analysis which will survive neither logic,
common experience, nor the decided case law of this Court
in the area of individual privacy. The greatest danger of
such a device, however, is its destructive effect upon one
of the basic guarantees which a society, if it is to remain
free, must provide each citizen-the right to walk the public streets secure in the knowledge that, without probable
cause to do so, the police cannot put their hands on his or
her body for any purpose.
B. A "Frisk" in the A.baence of Probable Carue la
Not a Reaaonable Search Within the Meaning
of the Fourth Amendment

Once it has been determined that a frisk is, in fact and
law, a search within the operation of the Fourth Amendment, those who seek constitutional justification for police
frisks without either a contemporaneous arrest or a search
warrant based upon probable cause, urge that such frisks
of the accused's person. In White v. United States, 271 F. 2d 829
(D. C. Cir., 1959), the court held that a law enforcement officer
had violated the accused's constitutional rights where:
"The officer had no warrant of any kind and no probable cause
to accost appellant, require him to place his hands in a certain position, and frisk him."
In State v. Collins, 150 Conn. 488, 491-92, the court held:
"The 'frisking' of the defendant, as he stood against the car,
to see if he was armed was also a search of the person."
See also Ellis v. United States, 264 F. 2d 372, 374 (D. C. Cir. 1959)
cert. den. 359 U. S. 948; People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 871-72,
194 N. Y. S. 326, 331-32 (1922).
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are "reasonable" police conduct whenever they are based
upon the police officer's "suspicion"-which in New York,
at least, may be a purely "intuitive" one-that the subject
of the ·search has committed a crime or is about to commit
a crime in fiituro and that the police officer may be in
danger. Since the Fourth Amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches and seizures (the argument runs) the
reasonableness of the police conduct is a constitutionally
adequate substitute for probable cause, and the "frisk" is
therefore a valid search.
This contention, although novel, flatly contradicts a
wealth of authority construing the Fourth Amendment.
More importantly, the adoption of such a construction of
the Fourth Amendment would effectively eviscerate the
right of privacy the Amendment was designed to protect.
This Court has unmistakably held on numerous occasions
that any search of the person of an accused without a warrant is constitutional only if made incident to an arrest
based upon "probable cause" to believe that the accused
has committed a crime. ~ 3 The historical roots of the requirement of probable cause were explored at length in
Henry v. United States, 361 L". S. 98, 100-102 (1959). Since
the stop and frisk doctrine purports to authorize searches
on "suspicion", "reasonable suspicion" or even "intuition",
it is relevant to note that in the Henry case this Court specifically held :
This Court has never used the "reasonableness" test to take the
place of probable cause as a necessary element of a lawful arrest
or search. In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950),
this Court enunciated the "reasonableness:' test solely for the purpose of determining whether, after an arrest pursuant to a valid
warrant, a showing of probable cause to search was sufficient to
preclude the necessity of obtaining a search warrant as well.
23
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"As the early American decisions both before and immediately after its [the Fourth Amendment's] adoption
show, common rumor or report, suspicion, or even
'strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support
a warrant for arrest. And that principle has survived
to this day ... It was against this background that
scholars recently wrote, 'Arrest on mere suspicion collides violently with the basic human right of liberty'.
. . . 'Vhile a search without a warrant is, within
limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an
arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental
search, it must be made with probable cause." (361
U. S. 101-102) (emphasis added).
The basic constitutional requirement of "probable cause" is
clearly stated in Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), a
case which has been cited by proponents of the stop and
frisk doctrine for the proposition that:
"A State is not precluded from 'developing workable
rules' governing searches to meet 'the practical demands of effecfrrn criminal investigations and law enforcement' if the State does not violate the constitutional standard of what is reasonable." 2 •
Although the majority cf this Court divided evenly on applying the Fourth Amendment's constitutional criteria to
the facts of the Ker case, eight of the nine justices unequivocally agreed that probable cause is an absolute necessity
for any search. Mr. Justice Clark, with the concurrence of
Justices Black, Stewart, and White, observed:
2~

People v. Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 448 (1964); see also People
v. Peters, 18 N. Y. 2d 238, 247 (1966); State v. Terry, 214 N. E . 2d
714, 121-22 (1966); State v. Dilley, 49 N. J . 460, 470 (1967).
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"The evidence at issue, in order to be admissible, must
be the product of a search incident to a lawful arrest,
since the officer had no search warrant. The lawfulness
of the arrest without a warrant, in turn, must be based
upon probable cause .. . " (374 U. S. at 34-35).
And Mr. Justice Brennan noted in an opinion in ·which the
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, and l\Ir. Justice Goldberg concurred :

"It is much too late in the day to deny that a lawful
entry is as essential to vindication of the protections
of the Fourth Amendment as for example, probable
cause to arrest or a search warrant for a search not
incident to an arrest" (374 U. S. at 53).
In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964) both the majority
and dissenting justices of this Court again agreed that the
Fourth Amendment requires "probable cause" for any
search whether with or without a warrant (378 U. S. at 112,
n. 3 and 378 U. S. at 122):

Thus, our analysis of the "frisk" as a Fourth Amendment violation returns to its place of beginning. A frisk
must be a search as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment. And as a search it cannot be a reasonable search
unless it is accompanied by probable cause to arrest or
search. Since, in the cases at bar, neither probable cause
to ai"rest nor probable cause to search could be shown, except by use of the yield of the frisk itself, the frisks themselves were unreasonable searches and their yield should
have been suppressed by command of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
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m.
Protection of police officers cannot justify the use of
the yield of the frisk in evidence against petitioners.

Amici have demonstrated (Argument II, supra) that a
frisk for weapons ''ithout probable cause to arrest or
search is an unreasonable search expressly prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment. It follows that the yield of such
a search must be suppressed by virtue of the exclusionary
rule made applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
u. s. 643 (1961).
But the sponsors of exceptional constitutional treatment for such frisks urge that society's substantial interest
in protecting the lives of its law enforcement authorities
in the course of their investigation of crime compel relaxation of settled constitutional principles to achieve this important societal purpose. They urge that such searches
are necessary for crime investjgation and police protection,
that they are, therefore, not constitutionally infirm, and
that, as a result, the exclusionary rule does not reach their
fruits. Because everyone is quite correctly concerned
with the safety of the police in the performance of their
dangerous and highly important function of preserving
order, the argument has a certain surface appeal.
Upon closer inspection, however, the argument disintegrates entirely. For (A) adequate exceptions for police
necessity already exist in the Fourth Amendment case
law, and the addition of new ones in the "stop and frisk"
sphere is not necessary for the protection of legitimate
police interests, and (B) as a practical matter, the use
in evidence of the yield of searches made in violation of
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clear Fourth Amendment principle would provide great
incentive for police officers, under the guise of self-protection, to make general searches of the person, thus frustrating the great purposes of the Fourth Amendment which
the exclusionary rule was designed to protect.
Each of these contentions will be considered below.
A. There ls No Legitimate Police Need for the "Frisk"
E%ception to Fourth Amendment Protections

When police necessity is urged as a ground for legitimizing frisks without probable cause, the listener has the
unerring feeling that he has heard the argument somewhere before. It was precisely this argument that was made
to obtain this Court's approval of the warrantless search
incidental to a valid arrest, an exception to the general requirement that searches must be by warrant. 25
Originating as a dictum justifying the search of the
person of an accused pursuant to valid arrest, 28 it was
expanded to include the immediate place of arrest21 and
25 "Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police
have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the
fruits of or implements used to commit the crime * * * . This right
to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things
under the accused's immediate control * * ,.;, and. to an extent depending- on the circumstances of the case, to the ·place where he is
arrested * * * ." Preston i.-. United States. 376 'C. S. 364, 367
(1964). See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 770 (1966);
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102 (1965); l"nited States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950) ; Harris Y. United States, 331
U. S. 145 (1947); Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
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Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

27

Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).

28
the entire four-room apartment of an accused who was
arrested in one of the rooms. 28 Although the "incidental
search" exception to the requirement of a warrant has gone
far beyond its origins and, perhaps, its rationale, 29 there is
no denying the fact that it was originally conceived as a
means of protecting the arresting officer against attack by
concealed weapons and as a means of preventing the
immediate destruction of fruits or instrumentalities of
crime.80
Never, until the "stop and frisk" cases, however, has
there been any claim that an officer may utilize an invalid
arrest to justify the seizure and use of evidence for which
he was not entitled to search.
This Court has never heretofore permitted any relaxation of the constitutional requirements for searches and
seizure on the grounds of self-defense of the police officer.
Any such exception on grounds of expediency would seem
markedly inconsistent with thi_s Court's many holdings that
fundamental Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights may not
be violated in the supposed interests of better law enforce28

Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947).

: 9 See Justice Frankfurter's strong critique of the extension of
the "incidental search" rule in his dissent in 'Cnited States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 68-86 ( 1950).
30 "The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified • • •
by the need to seize weapons and other things "hich might be used
to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to
prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime-things which
might easily happen where the weapon or e\idence is on the accused's person or under his immediate control." Preston v. United
States, 376 U. S. 364, 367 (1964); United States v. Ventresca, 380
U. S. 102 ( 1965). See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S.
56, 72 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (1950); Palmer v. United
States, 203 F. 2d 66, 67 (D. C. Cir. 1953); and Note, 17 BAYLOR
L. R. 312 (1965).
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ment or greater public safety. E.g., Miranda v. .Arizona,
384 U. S. 436, 479-82 (1966); 'JJ{app v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643,
659-60 (1961).
Moreover, the claim that the right to stop and frisk
without probable cause is necessary for police or public
safety is at best an unproven one. Cf. Berger v. United
States, 388 U. S. 41, 60 (1967). As Judge Fuld stated in
his dissenting opinion in No. 74 below:
"Of course, there are risks inherent in investigatory
activities undertaken by the police but, certainly, it
does not follow from that that the police are privileged,
absent probable cause, to search anyone who looks or
acts suspiciously and to use against him any articles
they may find on his person. As I previously observed,
'Other methods are available whereby the police may
protect themselves while carrying on their investigations, other procedures which, if utilized, will safeguard the police and the community from the criminal
minority without destroying the sense of dignity and
freedom with which the law-abiding majority walk the
the streets.' (People v. R,ivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 452
[dissenting opinion], cert. den. 379 U. S. 978.)" 18
N. Y. 2d at 248. 31
Amici submit that the warrantless search of the person
and the area within his immediate control permitted incident to a contemporaneous valid arrest is sufficient recognition of the police officer's legitimate need to protect himJustice Souris of the Supreme Court of Michigan has also expressed doubts as to the necessity for stop and frisk legislation.
Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use and
Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J . Crim. L., C. & P. S. 251 (1966) .
31
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self, without fashioning new exceptions to Fourth Amendment principle which would eliminate the need for "some
valid basis in law [to justify] the intrusion'' of arrest or
search.32
B. The Deterrent Effect of Strict Application of the
E%clwionary Rule Will Keep Invasions of Privacy
to a Practical Minimum

The Court of Appeals in Terry stood logic upon its head
by pointing out, as part of its rationale for refusing to
enforce the exclusionary rule that-even if "stops and
frisks" without probable cause are unconstitutional-vigorous application of the exclusionary rule in the "stop and
frisk" area is inappropriate since the rule will have no
deterrent e:ffect upon police officers 'Yho, not wishing to
commit suicide, will continue to frisk suspects for weapons,
no matter what courts choose to do with the resulting evidence. 33 Such reasoning ignores this Court's clear holding
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 6~3 (1963), that "the exclusion32

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948).

33 Paraphrasing will not do justice to the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals on this point. "The Mapp exclusionary rule was
imposed upon the states not because of some command inherent in
the fourth amendment, but rather because the Supreme Court believed that it was the only way the police could be forced to respect
the fourth amendment. If the police could not obtain a conviction
using evidence unlawfully obtained, they would have no incentive
to conduct illegal searches. If we keep in mind this raison d'etre
of the exclusionary rule, we can guard against confusion in the
attendant rules that are developed. A judicial rule rendering evidence produced as a result of a frisk inadmissible would fail to
deter the police from frisking suspects beliered to be armed as
police frisk for their own protection rather than for the purpose
of looking for evidence. A rule of admissibility in such cases could
only result in allowing the armed criminal to go free although
failing to any meaningful extent to protect individual liberty."
(Emphasis added.)
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ary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" 34 and is not a discretionary rule of
evidence for courts to apply or withhold from application
as they deem appropriate. The Court of Appeals' reasoning
also does not consider the possibility, well evidenced by the
facts of No. 63 and No. 74, 35 that there are law enforcement
personnel who, in an excess of zeal, engage in general
searches of the persons of suspects for purposes of general
harassment and to see what incriminating evidence they
can find even though they have no reason at all to fear for
their safety. 36 Those of us who are not as convinced that
the police will use their vast power with such unanimous
bona fides, but who adhere instead to the principle announced by this Court, that "[p] ower is a heady thing; and
history shows that the police acting on their own cannot
be trusted," 31 must disassociate ourselves from the rosy
view of law enforcement embraced by the Court of Appeals.
In view of the fact that general exploratory searches will
unquestionably occur under- the guise of self-protection, it
seems perfectly clear that the incentive for such unconstitutiona] police conduct will be materially reduced only
by vigorous application of the Fourth Amendment ex367 U. S. at 657. See also, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. at 655
(1961); Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963).
34

35 See also People v. Pugach, 15 N. Y. 2d 65, 204 N. E. 2d 176
(1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 936 (1965); People v. Machel, 234 Cal.
App. 2d 37, 44 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1st Dist. Ct. of App. 1965), cert.
den. 382 U.S. 839 (1965); People v. Garrett, 238 Cal. App. 2d 324,
47 Cal. Rptr. 731 (3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1965).

The Court of Appeals opinion disingenuously notes that "police
officers seem unanimous in stating that frisking is done for selfprotection and not as a mere evidentiary :fishing expedition."
36

37
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McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).

32
clusionary rule. If law enforcement authorities know that
weapons and other evidence seized during the course of an
unconstitutional frisk will be suppressed by constitutional
command, the number of unconstitutional invasions of privacy will be reduced, at the very least, to those instances
where the officer genuinely fears for his safety.
And thus the threat of "stop and frisk" police procedures, another of the new devices "that have emerged from
century to century wherever excessive power is sought by
the few at the expense of the many" 38 will be laid to rest.

CONCLUSION

Amici have urged the constitutional infirmity of an
on-the-street detention as an illegal arrest, the invalidity of
an accompanying "frisk" as an unreasonable search, and
the barrenness of the attempted justification of both
in the name of crime prevention and the safety of th~
interrogating officer. Despite the clamor of the constabulary to the contrary, the highly critical area of on-the-street
arrests and accompanying searches demands no relaxation
of Fourth Amendment standards, but vigorous adherence
to them. Otherwise, "a method will have been devised by
which the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures may be evaded and the
exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, • • • to a large extent,
written off the books." 39
38 Black, J., dissenting in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46,
89 (1947).
39 Fuld, J., dissenting in People v. Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 448,
201 N. E. 2d 32, 36 (1964).
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The requirement of probable cause is a compromise which
has been found for accommodating the citizen's basic right
to privacy and the need for effective criminal investigation
and law enforcement. "Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less '\Vould be to leave lawabiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or
caprice." •0
If probable cause is to continue to be a workable and useful concept to balance the citizen's right of privacy against
police necessity, it ought not be relegated to a caricature of
a stricture against law enforcement excesses, a status which
must surely follow if police officers, with constitutional
sanction, are permitted-rather, encouraged-to compel
suspects, during a period of non-arrest, to disgorge incriminating information and evidence which will raise
their suspicions to probable cause and thereby validate a
subsequent arrest. It is too late in the day and too destructive of constitutional values to attempt to "justify
the arrest by the search anq at the same time justify the
search by the arrest." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10, 15 (1947).

Accordingly, amici join in, and call upon this Court to
make its own, the stirring language of Judge Fuld:
" • • • The loss of liberty entailed in authorizing a
species of search on the basis of mere suspicion is too
high a price to pay for the small measure of added
security it promises. Other methods are available
whereby the police may protect themselves while
carrying on their investigations, other procedures
which, if utilized, will safeguard the police and the
comm.unity from the eriminal minority without de"0
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Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949).

34

stroying the sense of dignity and freedom with which
the law-abiding majority walk the streets.
"To what end security if liberty be sacrificed as its
pricef The privacy which the Constitution guarantees
is assured to the best of men only if it is vouchsafed to
the worst, however distasteful that may be. Thus,
although the defendant before us undoubtedly merits
the punishment provided by law for carrying a concealed weapon, I venture that it is better that he go
free than that we sanction a significant inroad on the
rights of all our citizens." n
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